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This article draws upon three theoretical arguments to frame the ideological nature of global 
intellectual property rights. The first is the work of Robert Merges on the justification of intellectual 
property rights. The second work is the work of the early twentieth century American legal scholar 
Wesley Hohfeld and his theory on “conceptions of property”. The third work is that of John Rawls 
and his approach to “pluralism”. These works have a common theme in that they help to frame or 
conceptualise intellectual property rights in certain ideological existence I argue. The article explains 
that this ideological existence relates to how intellectual property rights are supported at the global 
level as instruments of private property governance.  The article assesses, for instance, how 
intellectual property rights in international instruments such as the TRIPs Agreement are seen as part 
of the ideological paradigm that maintains a “a right to property” beyond the state, but also compare 
how domestic participants such as farmers also believe they have a “right to property” in patented 
seeds owned by multinational corporations. The result is that both the domestic and international legal 




Can international intellectual property rights be justified? If so, what are the arguments to make such 
justification: legal, economic, or philosophical? The very concept of international intellectual 
property rights is, in itself problematic, as it suggests that there are certain forms of property rights 
that are transferable beyond the sovereign state. Moreover, determining the actuality of intellectual 
property as a form of property adds another layer of relationship with various interpretations. Another 
concern is the complexity of the relationship between legitimacy and intellectual property rights as 
ideology. This article address some of these questions.  
Given that the global intellectual property regime is a system of rights that are embodied in 
international treaties such as the TRIPs Agreement in the World Trade Organisation (WTO); then, 
the economic and legal aspects of these system of rights are essential in how as private rights, they 
transform and privatise public international law. That transformation, as argued elsewhere in this 
article, seeks to functionalise international law at the behest of private economic interests at the global 
                                                             
 Portions of this paper was largely inspired by, Justine Pila, “Pluralism, Principles and Proportionality in Intellectual 
Property” (2014) 34 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 181. This article was first written in October 2017 as part of a 
broader project on the privatisation of international law from an intellectual property perspective. This version was  revise 
in 2019. The author would like to thank Jan Klabbers for comments on an earlier draft of this article and two anonymous 
referees of this journal for their feedback. Margaret Llewleyn has been patient and ever gracious as usual.  
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level. These private economic interests are the owners of intellectual property rights through the 
corporate structure of domestic and international trade.  
A crucial question that the transformation and privatisation of public international law through global 
intellectual property rights raise is, whether, or not, intellectual property is fair, or, if there is justice 
in intellectual property rights. In order to address this question, then, it is necessary to discuss modern 
theories of property rights from an intellectual property perspective. Hence, the core of this article is 
(a) an examination of intellectual property rights against contemporary theories of justice and 
fairness, and (b) modern private rights in intellectual property.  
The theoretical and philosophical arguments addressed in this article are not so much to set the 
contours for predetermined conclusions. Rather, the theories on intellectual property allows for a 
broader debate when addressing the pros and cons of global intellectual property rights; and also, 
taking into account, the relevance of domestic rules and functions of international rules in relation to 
rights in intellectual property. Furthermore, the theories on intellectual property rights in this article 
are partly taken from real property theories and their interconnection for the modern world.1 Given 
that global intellectual property rules are codified in the TRIPs Agreement as private rights,2 then, 
international law can no longer be viewed as the sole domain of nation states. Instead, international 
law must be seen in a new light: a right to consider how private rights are transposed beyond the 
borders of sovereign states, and the response to any fundamental right to intellectual property.3  
B. A contextual overview on the classical Lockean notion of property 
 
Questions on the notion of property in western legal tradition have been, and remains, deeply rooted 
in theories of property as developed by John Locke (1632 – 1704).4 Locke’s work, in particular the 
labour market thesis, continues to inspire and divide scholars given the various interpretations of 
Locke’s work, and also how to properly interpret the exact arguments that Locke tried to convey.5 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to discuss private property rights  without reference to Locke’s thesis on 
labour (natural rights). Indeed, Locke’s contribution has been refined and expanded upon in many 
works; and his influence on private property rights over the centuries has impact legislations and other 
normative acts regulating property. But my discussion of Locke’s labour theory in the next few 
paragraphs is not a rejection or appraisal of the theory. Rather, it is to contextualise the theory in 
relation to intellectual property and ultimately exclude it from the trajectory of this article. This is so 
because my focus is on the modern theories of Wesley Hohfeld (1879 – 1918),6 John Rawls (1921 – 
2002), and Robert Merges (b. 1959).  
By focusing on twentieth century theories of property and their transposition to intellectual property, 
the article is better able to demonstrate that property rights accelerate the privatisation of international 
                                                             
1 Eg., Harold Demsetz, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights” (1967) 57 American Economic Review 347; Stephen 
Munzer (ed), New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property (Cambridge University Press, 2001); Robert 
Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2011). 
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), Annex 1C of the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 299, 4th recital; China – Measures 
Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (WT/DS362/R) 26 January 2009 [7.247] where 
the panel confirmed that provisions of the TRIPs Agreement reflects private rights.  
3 Phillips v Mulcaire, [2012] EWCA Civ 48, [10] defining intellectual property.  
4 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (2nd edition, CUP, 1967) (P. Laslett ed), chapter 5.   
5 Gopal Sreenivasan, The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property (Oxford University Press, 1995). 




law.7 Although international law has been linked to the property dimension by classical scholars such 
as Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645), Samuel von Pufendorf (1632 – 1694), Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 
1832), Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) among others,8 the emphasis in this article is the modern 
context. However, it will be shown that classical property rights theories influences modern legal 
scholars approaches to property rights; and similarly, modern conceptions of property rights further 
influences liberal theories and legislations on property.9 The transposition of the real property 
narrative to justify intellectual property is then evident in the philosophical dimension of property 
that is grounded in Lockean approaches that permeates contemporary Rawlsian liberalism and 
Mergesian pluralism (discussed further below).  
Locke in the Second Treatise develops an argument that there is a natural right to property, or, as he 
writes: “every man has a property right in his own person.”10 This brief and artificial phrase articulates 
two things: a form of intellectual creativity (because of natural resources), and the right to own that 
intellectual creativity (as a form of property). The reason for this, as Locke notes, is that, where a 
person “hath mixed his labour with and joined it to something that is his own”,11 he then “makes his 
property”12 and as such, reflects human productiveness. Although Locke was writing in an era when 
majority of the land (real property) was owned by the English nobility, the very resources on the land, 
were in a way common to nature and thereby accessible for everyone. However, there is another way 
that Locke’s labour theory can be interpreted. Seen differently, Locke was defending the nobility’s 
ownership of the land and its resources for the use in trade and commerce.13 This interpretation is 
more suitable for making the connection of Locke’s labour theory to real property rights in 
intellectual property in the modern sense.14 But as we shall later see in this article, the modern 
theoretical thoughts of Rawls, Hohfeld and Merges are also Lockean in that they relates to liberalism, 
value fairness and forms a cohesive chain that reflected theories on property rights over the centuries. 
Nevertheless, in broader terms, Locke’s natural rights approach to property is a form of exclusive 
right – a private right that generates legitimacy through the participation of government through laws 
and regulations. This should be viewed against the broader context of Locke’s work as he was giving 
a general account of government and in that regard, the natural right to property reflects the rationality 
of civil government and economic spill-overs.15 But more specifically, Locke, in his treatise saw 
labour as the source and origins of private property and thereby a “rational justification for property 
in the products of the earth.”16 Locke’s treatment of private property resonates well throughout the 
                                                             
7 P. Sean Morris, “From Territorial to Universal: The Extraterritoriality of Trademark Law and the Privatizing of 
International Law” (2019) 37 Cardoza Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 33; “To What Extent do Intellectual Property 
Rights Drive the Nature of Private International Law in the Era of Globalism?” (2019) 28 Iowa Transnational Law & 
Contemporary Problems 421.  
8 Munzer (n 1) 1. 
9 Ibid, noting that Hohfeld influence on academic lawyers is evident in the American Law Institute, Restatement of the 
Law of Property (St. Paul, Minnesota, 1944). 
10 Walton Hamilton, “Property – According to Locke” (1932) 41 Yale Law Journal 864, 867. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid, 868.  
14 Eg, Edwin Hettinger, “Justifying Intellectual Property” (1989) 18 Philosophy and Public Affairs 31; Adam Moore, “A 
Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property” (1997) 21 Hamline Law Review 65.    
15 Matthew Kramer, John Locke and the Origins of Private Property: Philosophical Explorations of Individualism, 
Community, and Equality (CUP, 1997) 118; 118 – 127; Barbara Arneil, John Locke and American: The Defence of English 
Colonialism (OUP, 1996). 
16 Arneil, ibid, 137. 
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centuries with wealth maximisation and innovation. This, despite Locke’s critics17 who have 
suggested that his treatment of natural rights and private property rights are inconsistent.18  
The progress of economic development, expansion of wealth, democratic liberalism and intellectual 
innovation over the centuries, however, I believe vindicates Locke, despite his critics: private 
property is acquired through the mixing of labour and common resources. The question now becomes, 
how to move away from the Lockean conception or theory of property, to connect international 
intellectual property in the modern sense; and whether questions on justice or fairness affects the 
notion of property. However, to address that question on the contemporary legitimacy of intellectual 
property rights in the international intellectual system, it is best to address theories on property by 
twentieth century contemporaries. Furthermore, by the time rules at the global level regulating 
intellectual property rights were implemented in the TRIPS Agreement, the legitimacy of those rules 
was already being questioned in the context of justice and fairness.  
To examine these arguments in greater detail, the works of Hohfeld, Rawls and Merges are discussed 
to draw parallels or establishes the unbroken chain of property rights in the classical Lockean sense. 
But, given Locke’s view that the use of private property is restricted, it can also be said, that 
international intellectual property rules allows for the restricted use of the right to property in creative 
innovations and goods at the global level. If this is the case, then, a concern is whether creative 
innovations and goods at the global level are common goods, or, are they, private goods governed by 
(public international) law. If they are seen as common goods how useful then is the Lockean 
approach? But, on the other hand, if property rules recognise them as private goods, how should the 
international rules respond? Will there be the need to resort to private law rules?  I argue that the 
modern approach to property rules in intellectual property and their justification is the proper analysis 
as opposed to the classical Lockean approach given that new forms of property and norms presents 
new opportunities for justifying fairness and property in modern creative innovation and goods.  
C. Rights to intellectual property and contemporary theories of justice and fairness 
 
How does intellectual property fit in the modern world; and especially, how does one separate the 
property in patents, copyrights or trademarks from the rigidity and restrictiveness of tangible 
property? Is it really possible to differentiate the restrictiveness of tangible property from intellectual 
property, when, like tangible property, intellectual property rules endowed restrictiveness and 
monopoly rights? What if there are no suitable answers to these questions can intellectual property 
rights be justified, and if so, are there avenues in which one can search for justifications? If not, are 
there any alternatives theories that can justify the property regimes of copyrights, patents and 
trademarks? These are difficult questions that I cannot pretend will be addressed in their entirety in 
this article but an exposition into the foundational elements of modern theories can help to shape the 
correct dialogue.  
From the standpoint of the academic literature two works stands out in terms of addressing some of 
the questions that I raised in this article in the context of intellectual property. An edited collection in 
2008 by respected scholars – Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice;19 and a remarkable 
expository monograph by Robert Merges – Justifying Intellectual Property20 – have managed to 
provocatively expose the intellectual property paradigm in theories of justice. This is not to say that 
                                                             
17 James Truly, A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (CUP, 1980); Ross Harrison, Hobbes, Locke, 
and Confusion’s Masterpiece (CUP, 2003) 244.  
18 Sreenivasan (n 5) chapter four in general “Limitations of the Original Theory.” 
19 Axel Gosseries, Alain Marciano and Alain Strowel (eds), Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice (Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008). 
20 Robert Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property (Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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there aren’t other works that address the theoretical and philosophical nature of intellectual property 
and justice in broad terms, on the contrary, there are plenty works.21 However to manage the 
discussion in this section, my comments are restricted to the two mentioned above because of their 
contribution to the debate.  
The editors and contributors of Intellectual Property Theories of Justice for instance addressed some 
of the very same questions that I am attempting to in this article. The contributors looked at some of 
the conditions under which intellectual property is fair and the differences between real property and 
intellectual property. Sensing the fragmented nature of justice; the contributors and editors in 
Intellectual Property Theories of Justice provided thematic elements of justice and their connections 
to rights in intellectual property. As such, the volume conceded that focusing “exclusively on theories 
of justice for which the concept of property is more central” was unavoidable.22 This conclusion is 
important, as it, corroborates the argument that property rights are private rights as opposed to 
common goods, and therefore, responds better to private (international) law rules..  
Merges’ Justifying Intellectual Property adds essential analysis and a rigorous investigation of justice 
and intellectual property. Merges objects to the property model in intellectual property law and 
develops a theory of intellectual property based on the Rawlsian concept of foundational pluralism.23 
Merges’ work is more radical than Intellectual Property Theories of Justice in that be broadens the 
conception of property based on pluralism. Thus, seen in a different light, a pluralistic approach to 
(intellectual) property, then requires a broader system of law than the narrow private law approach. 
Hence, for rules to respond adequately to the pluralistic conception of property – an established 
system of customary rules, could, in theory, be appropriate. But, it is Merges’ pluralistic principles-
based theory of intellectual property as derived from  critical examinations of the philosophy and 
theories of property that motivates me to (a) offer my own analysis of the ideological formations of 
intellectual property in this article. Another motivation is to (b) propose later in this article that the 
pluralistic constellation of sovereign states in the international order allows private rights holders to 
use intellectual property to privatise public international law.24  
But before getting into those discussions the relevance or contributions of theories of justice must be 
examined in their contemporary setting. I will examine three contemporary approaches to rights and 
how they relate to justice, fairness and intellectual property. I will begin with (a) the Hohfeldian 
conceptions of rights and property. Hohfeld has had influence not only on the legal scholarship but 
also legislative norms in property such as the Restatement in American property law. The second 
approach is (b) the Rawlsian system of liberalism, where, Rawls advocates rights in a liberal 
democratic system as principles. And the third approach (c) how Merges, an American legal scholar 
justifies intellectual property based on pluralistic principles. The goal is that by offering these 
discussions, intellectual property from the perspective of real property can be seen in an objective 
manner (or justified). Another goal is to open up the corridor of intellectual property on the 
international legal plane including how specific  regimes such as trademarks, patents or copyrights  
shapes private rights obligations in international law. 
1. Hohfeldian concepts of property and rights  
 
                                                             
21 Eg, Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Dartmouth Publishing, 1996); Alexandra George, 
Constructing Intellectual Property (CUP, 2012); Annabelle Lever (ed), New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual 
Property (CUP, 2012). 
22 Above (n 19) 8; John Sanders, “Justice and the Initial Acquisition of Property” (1987) 10 Harvard Journal of Law and 
Public Policy 367. 
23 Merges (n 20) 5 – 10.  
24 See (n 7).  
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The American legal scholar Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1879 – 1918) is perhaps not that well known. 
Yet, he is forever associated with the American Law Institute and the Restatement of the Law on 
Property. Shortly after Hohfeld’s death in 1918, the US Supreme Court ruled in INS v AP that there 
are “quasi-property rights” in news.25 At the heart of the INS v AP case was the nature of property 
and its application to the copyright regime of intellectual property. The notion of property in INS v 
AP was both Lockean and Hohfeldian. Lockean, in that the Court endorsed the labour theory that 
creators are allowed to reap the gains from the property of their creation.26 The decision was also 
Hohfeldian in that it acknowledged the Hohfeldian language of rights and privileges (although lacking 
engagement).27 It was also Hohfeldian in the sense that the Court explained  that quasi-property exists 
in news “irrespective of the rights” that both parties claim.28  
Hohfeld main intellectual work – “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning” was first published in 191329 and later expanded in 1917 where he developed a system 
of jural relations in which he analysed legal rights.30 Hohfeld’s “Fundamental Legal Conceptions” 
dissects a bundle of rights which underpins property in general. For Hohfeld, the notion and usage of 
rights, in relation to property (and the broader common law system) are not only correlated but the 
various concepts that denotes rights share a specific jural relation (legal right). The jural relations that 
Hohfeld developed covers “privilege”, “right”, “power”, “no-right”, “liability”, “immunity”, 
“disability”, and “duty”.31 These jural relations, or as I sometimes refer to them as, Hofeldian cells, 
are seen as the natural embodiment of property rights because they link human economic activities to 
an efficient society where economic relation are dependent on the legal claims to labour and 
resources. The eight Hohfeldian cells on the legal discourse of a legal right remain pillars of the 
foundations of law and rights in the contemporary Anglo-American context  and influences new 
forms of property rights such as those in intellectual property.  
The rights in intangibles such as intellectual property are difficult to claim without invoking 
Hohfeldian cells on legal conceptions, and in this regard, rights in real property are no different from 
rights in intangibles. In other words, Hohfeld’s legal conceptions are a like an inter-stellar system 
where all planetary bodies can invoke  a legal relation with other interplanetary systems by using  the 
language of law and legal rights to make a claim.32 For Hohfeld, property is the primary biological 
structure in which the cells on rights can form a living object in order for a claim of ownership, or, 
the legal right, to be asserted. If, property, as the biological object for which rights can be asserted 
through the cells on legal claims, then property (and all asserted rights) is unstable. Hohfeld was 
actually suspicious of property as a legal structure because it “has no definite or stable connotation.”33 
Therefore, because property, for Hohfeld was Janus-faced in character: “sometimes it is employed to 
                                                             
25 International News Service v Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
26 Ibid, noting that there is a “right to acquire property by honest labor.”  
27 Ibid, 235. 
28 Ibid, 236.  
29 See (n 6).  
30 Hohfeld has been one of the most influential thinker in American legal thought and he has been credited for his 
analytical brilliance of rights where he focused especially on the internal structure of legal rights: see Hohfeld (n 6); 
Hohfeld later built upon his 1913 work with a follow-up article, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning” (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710 – 770. But see John Salmond, Jurisprudence or the Theory of the Law 
(London: Stevens and Haynes, 1902) discussing similar rights as Hohfeld; Andrew Halpin, “Hohfeld’s Conceptions: 
From Eight to Two” (1985) 44 Cambridge Law Journal 435.  
31 Hohfeld (n 6) 58 referring to the eight conceptions as “the lowest common denominators of the law.”  
32 Ibid, noting that legal positions are reduced to the “lowest generic conceptions to which all ‘legal quantities’ may be 
reduced.” 
33 Ibid, 21.  
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indicate the physical object […] the word is used to denote the legal interests” in relation to physical 
object,34 then property must be viewed through some claims-right system. 
I believe that it is the enigmatic structure of property rights, that is, a relation to legal interests and its 
lack of stability in the universe of rights that allowed Hohfeld to develop the fundamental legal 
conceptions as both jural opposites and jural correlatives35 where law and rights are generally applied 
to property.36 In this regard, Hohfeld saw the jural correlatives of rights and duties not only 
incorporating property in its biological structure but also power, privilege and immunity. Actually, 
Hohfeld relied on an 1852 ruling by the New York Supreme Court, People v Dikeman,37 which said 
that right, in the legal sense, applies to “property in its restricted sense, but it is often used to designate 
power, prerogative, and privilege.”38 Here, we can determine that Hohfeld through his merging of 
legal interest in property as a system of rights that includes, for example, powers and privileges, 
allows for the complex structure of rights that exists in property, to be better understood in order to 
determine “the correct solution of legal problems.”39 Hohfeld’s work, has been the subject of 
numerous analysis and criticisms,40 yet, his work continues to be essential in how rights are 
determined not only in real property but the offshore intangible of intellectual property.41 I will return 
to intellectual property in the Hohfeldian realm later in the article, however, before doing so, it is 
worth to put into context Hohfeld’s normative realm of rights in property and how those rights are 
transpose to other legal realms.  
So far, we have seen that Hohfeld developed a system of rights that is based on eight conceptions that 
are narrowed down to four relations: “powers”, “immunities”, “claims” (rights) and “privileges” 
(liberties). Not all these uses of rights can be addressed in this article, but, for the broader purpose of 
this work, the Hohfeldian notions of claims (rights) and privileges (liberties) needs some elaboration 
and juxtaposition among the systems of rights in broader legal relations. Moreover, Hohfeld himself 
conceded that it is only proper to refer to a claim as a right because of a proper legal relation.42 
Nevertheless, in the Hohfeldian world of rights-claims, these are legal rights that correlates to legal 
duties,43 and liberty correlates with the absence of a legal duty.44 In other words, a claim-right is 
distinctive and different from a liberty-right and failure to make the distinction would amounts to 
nothing but a fallacy.45  
But the important thing in understanding Hohfeld, in particular, when discussing rights (claims), 
especially from a legal perspective, is to approach rights-claims as “legal relation which is most 
properly called a right or claim” as Hohfeld illustrates in his own words.46 This is so because 
Hohfeld’s logical system of rights are meant to be applied during jural relations, that is, the law and 
its applicability over claims of legal rights between X and Y (rights and duties held by individuals 
                                                             
34 Ibid. See further at 22, noting that land is not property and property in a legal sense refers to “the rights of the owner in 
relation to it” (citations omitted). 
35 Ibid, 30.  
36 Ibid.  
37 People v Dikeman, 7 How. Pr. 124 (1852), cited in Hohfeld, ibid. See Blades v Higgs (1865), 11 H. L. Cas, 621: 
“Property ratione privilegii is the right by which a peculiar franchise anciently granted by the Crown, by virtue of 
prerogative”, as cited in Hohfeld, ibid.  
38 Hohfeld (n 6) 30.  
39 Ibid, 19.  
40 See (n 30).  
41 Hohfeld cited and quoted at length, JB Ames, “Purchase for Value Without Notice” (1887) 1 Harvard Law Review 1, 
9.   
42 See, infra (n 46). 
43 Stephen Hudson and Douglas Husak, “Legal Rights: How Useful is Hohfeldian Analysis?” (1980) 37 Philosophical 
Studies 45.  
44 Hudson, ibid, 46. 
45 Hohfeld (n 6) 19. 
46 Ibid, 33.  
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against other individuals, in personam) or A, B, C versus D (or rights and duties held against multiple 
individuals, in rem). In the absence of a legal rights claim, then it makes no sense applying Hohfeldian 
logical system of rights, rather, other systems of rights that are broader or moral rights,47 would be 
more appropriate.48 Thus, the Hohfeldian notion of rights are legal rights to ownership (property) and 
for the purposes of this article, such property, extends to offshore properties such as intellectual 
property, to which, a claim, in the strictest sense of a right exists (discussed in detail below).  
One of the more legalistic and definite statement by Hohfeld regarding the correlatives of rights is 
that legal relations are, properly, a right49 and this statement resonates with complex legal questions 
that are raised in courts and tribunals within and beyond the nation state. So, where does Hohfeld’s 
concepts of rights interact with the external world outside of the narrow jural relations of the domestic 
state? This article argues that such interaction is in Hohfeld’s treatment of rights in rem – and its 
multital appeal, given that in rem rights reside in a single person or group of persons.50 Hohfeld’s 
treatment of in rem rights took on more significance in his 1917 article where he used a good  amount 
of case law to demonstrate that in rem rights are more appropriate as methodological “tools for the 
comprehending and systematizing of our complex legal materials.”51 The shift to the case law analysis 
in the 1917 article was to present the jurisprudence of rights as originally sketched in 1913 in more 
practical terms that the dispensers of the law: judges and lawyers could more easily absorbed in the 
expanding field of judicial opinions and statutes.  
One key claim by  Hohfeld on rights in rem was that “a multital right, or claim, (right in rem) is not 
always one relating to a thing, i.e., a tangible object” as such. Rather, he suggested, right also extends 
to regimes of intellectual property such as books (copyrights) and patents.52 Hohfeld explained: 
“Multital rights (or claims) relating neither to definite tangible object nor to (tangible) person, e.g., a 
patentee’s right, or claim, that any ordinary person shall not manufacture articles covered by the 
patent.”53 Hohfeld’s identification of rights in intangibles (offshore properties in this article or the 
intellectual property regime) was to enable the legal interpretation of rights in such a way that the law 
apply correctly from a rights perspective in the cases that the Courts were confronted with. Moreover, 
it was also a way of enabling the content and structure of the law to be more people friendly and not 
too distant from the needs of the society. Thus, rights in intangibles both by a single member in society 
and also rights in intangibles by a group of members (corporate) in society are, simply rights, protected 
by statutes. Therefore, both rights-claims (and privileges) are legal interests in property,54 including 
intangibles,55 and enjoy the jural relations created by statutes.  
When the US Supreme Court was confronted with the question of property in news in INS v AP it 
framed quasi-property as a form of right in a traditional sense that harboured Hohfeldian rights. The 
INS v AP decision was made in the midst of the Hohfeldian debate on the concept rights. Furthermore, 
the way the Supreme Court decided the matter suggest a number of things. Firstly, the quasi-property 
right in the news directly relates to rights-claims and secondly, “the right to acquire property by honest 
                                                             
47 Eg, Gopal Sreenivasan, “Duties and Their Direction” (2010) 120 Ethics 465; Joel Feinberg, “Duties, Rights, and 
Claims” (1966) 3 American Philosophical Quarterly 137. 
48 See Eleanor Curran, ‘Blinded by the Light of Hohfeld: Hobbes’s Notion of Liberty’ (2010) 1 Jurisprudence 85; Arthur 
Yates, “A Hohfeldian Analysis of Hobbesian Rights” (2013) 32 Law and Philosophy 405.  
49 Hohfeld (n 6).  
50 Ibid; Christopher Newman, “Hohfeld and the Theory of In Rem Rights: An Attempted Mediation” George Mason Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. LS17-07, 15 September 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2925392. 
51 Hohfeld (1917) (n 30) 712 – 713, and at 718 explaining right in personam and “multital right, or claim, (right in rem)”. 
Further at 724, Hohfeld cited at length, Stephen Leake, Law of Property in Land (1st edition, 1874) 1 – 2.  
52 Ibid, 733. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, “The Analysis of Property Rights” (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (framing property 
rights in Hohfeldian language for the purpose of regulation).  
55 James Wilson, “Could There be a Right to Own Intellectual Property?” (2009) 28 Law and Philosophy 393. 
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labour”56  which “cost its producer money”57 links to rights-privileges. Then, thirdly, the market value 
in the news “for which those who have it not are ready to pay”58 correlates with rights-immunities, 
and fourthly, as property, the need for protection is an entitlement of the producer that correlates with 
rights-power. Schematically, this should appear as follows: 
 








“market value in 
the news” 
 
The above (table) interpretation is possible given that Hohfeld’s conception of rights are jural 
relations of multiple rights. Yet, the co-incident of the Hohfeldian concepts with the reasoning of the 
court in INS v AP suggest that the broader customary rules in society that transcends nations were 
integral to the Court’s reasoning. These customary rules are to protect property from external 
infringement and enforce rules (contracts and treaties) between parties.59 Moreover, a key point to be 
made from this Hohfeldian interpretation is that property; whether, as “quasi-property”, or, my 
classification of intellectual property in Hohfeldian language, offshore property, confirms that 
property is a form of legal relationship with the state. Therefore when questions of legal relations 
among states through property or offshore property, are raised then, it is not a question of the domestic 
state law alone, but those concerns requires the inclusion of an analysis on customs relating to 
property and external norms. 
In Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1913) Hohfeld never made a direct connection to offshore 
intangible (such as patents) forms of property. However, given that Hohfeld’s broader prognosis of 
jural relations of property is wide enough to cover most legal obligations, it is not difficult, to 
transpose or analyse Hohfeld from the realm of intellectual property. Hohfeld’s theory of legal 
interests as rights, including the concept of privilege,60 strike a chord with the regimes of intellectual 
property.61 But, on a broader account, discussing intellectual property in Hohfeldian language means 
acquiescence to jural relations of rights in privilege-right; power-right; claim-right and probably 
(immunity-right). This is because the intellectual property regime is made up of different system-
rights (trademarks, copyrights, patents) and that regime is covered by legislative-right to property. In 
other words, an international treaty on intellectual property rights (or a domestic law) provides for 
Hohfeldian bundle of property rights, to enjoy via use, to own and to exclude. In this regard, the 
intellectual property regime provides for a Hohfeldian claim-right to property in a trademark for 
example; and to be able to exclude others (infringers) from use of the trademark; so that the privilege-
right can be enjoyed; while, at the same time, the trademark owner can fulfil the power-right to 
acquire the property in trademarks through application or use.  
                                                             
56 INS v AP, 236. 
57 Ibid, 250. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Eg, Richard Epstein, “International News Services v Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of Property Rights 
in News” (1992) 78 Virginia Law Review 85; Walter Cook, “The Associated Press Case” (1919) 28 Yale Law Journal 
387; Shyram Balganesh, ‘“Hot News’: The Enduring Myth of Property in News” (2011) 111 Columbia Law Review 419; 
Christopher Wadlow, “A Riddle Whose Answer is ‘Tort’: A Reassessment of International News Services v Associated 
Press” (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 649.  
60 At note 60 Hohfeld cited Copyright Act, 8 Statue of Anne (1709) c. 19  and appeared to have equated liberty to privilege. 
61 Eg, Oren Bracha, “Standing Copyright Law on its Head? The Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of 
Property” (2007) 85 Texas Law Review 1799, 1806 (explaining that copyright law is the perfect example of a property 
right with Hohfeldian characteristics).  
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Hohfeld’s work on the nature of rights from the perspective of property reveals that the state is central 
to  questions relating to the rights in property. This is because, rights in property is a creature of the 
law – the domestic law of the state, whose powers include enforcement. In this regard, property rights 
is a form of legal relationship with the state and that relationship encompasses a series of rights that 
Hohfeld developed in Fundamental Legal Conceptions. For property rights to exist, the state must 
initiate legal rules relating to the protection of property. The protection of property in a state emanates 
from customs guaranteeing individuals to enter jural relations with the state so that individuals can 
claim rights to property. Because of this jural relations with the state, and private individuals, over 
the ownership and protection of property, states are obliged to exercise restraints in encroaching on 
private property. States are also required to protect the interests of private individuals in property 
from external forces through rules on the exclusivity of property, a point that the INS v AP Court 
reinforced.62  
Another relevance of the Hohfeldian concept of rights is that, for the broader interactions of states (in 
relation to rights over property) in the intellectual property regime, the laws governing states 
interactions are increasingly yielding to the legal rights of property owners. What this means is that, 
the law of nations (public international law) increasingly become privatised, as it must be used 
effectively by the owners of rights in the intellectual property regime to lay claim and enforce those 
rights when they are transposed beyond the domestic state. Hence, where Hohfeldian rights, claims 
and duties exist, so too, are the rights to privatise the law of nations given the significance of rights 
and privilege, and their distinction (in the international economic system). The economic significance 
of that distinction, was a point Hohfeld would, in his 1917 follow-up article, briefly touched upon: 
“as a matter of great practical consequence and economic significance, the property owner’s rights, 
or claims, should be sharply differentiated from his privileges.”63This, to my mind, should be seen as 
part of the internal structure and dynamic of rights in relation to intellectual property, and the 
economic significance of intellectual property as sponsors of  the privatisation of the law of nations.  
The internal economic structure of rights in property have been important in how other organic legal 
rules in the law of nations emerged. Thus, the internal structure of rights, is, in part, based on 
Hohfeldian thinking, that the content of intellectual property rules emerged in the same fashion as 
other rights in the international legal system, and its initial struggle for recognition and subsequently 
the economic structure of the international legal order.64 However, to further understand the economic 
system of rights and the intellectual property legal order, it is worth turning to notions of justice, 
fairness, and what I called market libertarianism based on the work of John Rawls.  
2. Rawls: pluralism and intellectual property rights (a Hohfeldian analysis) 
 
In the previous section it was established that Hohfeld developed an architecture of rights based on 
conceptions of property. Moreover, it was also established that the Hohfeldian concepts applies to 
what I refer to as offshore properties such as patents, copyrights or trademarks.  Given that Hohfeld 
has influenced significantly legal thought, the key question becomes, can Hohfeld’s concepts apply 
to liberal construction of rights or the space of many rights? If so, what is the connection to intellectual 
property rights. I explore in this section, or at least, try to argue that a connection between intellectual 
property and Rawlsian principles of justice and fairness exists. The section explores the argument by 
engaging with Rawls’ Political Liberalism where he develops the principle of pluralism. But given 
                                                             
62 INS v AP, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (Holmes, J., concurring).  
63 Hohfeld 1917 (n 30) 747.  




that Rawls’s major works are a trilogy: from the abstract (philosophical);65 to the practical in a state;66 
and then finally to the international;67 it is, for the purposes of this article, to harmonise Rawls’ 
theories to develop a defence or linking Rawlsian theories to intellectual property.68  
The starting premise is the understanding that the Rawlsian principle of basic liberty is applicable to 
intellectual property. This principle, as Rawls first developed in Theory of Justice argue that “each 
person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty 
for others.”69 This is generally referred to as Rawlsian First Principle, and it is this first principle, I 
relied on, as it has a more natural affinity to the rights language in Hohfeldian terms. Moreover, there 
is also a link to the broader international and intellectual property rights paradigm. For the purposes 
of this section I interpret Rawls first principle to include all members of a society: economic producers 
(rights owners) and economic participants (citizens). The second connection to intellectual property 
based on Rawlsian principles is constitution-like rules that are prevalent in a democratic and 
pluralistic society.70 I will return to this latter point shortly.  
Rawls, like Hohfeld, did not directly address intellectual property in his works, however, their views 
on property also directly relates to intellectual property. Rawls, for instance, in his major works, 
artificially addressed property with the underlying theme of distributive justice.71 In this section, I 
will rely on Political Liberalism where Rawls develops, among many other things, a theory of 
pluralism as a form of justice (but not necessarily for the international economic system) to apply his 
views to intellectual property. This approach will also lay the foundation for the arguments on the 
justification of intellectual property (below).  
At first, any discussion of Rawlsian principles of justice and intellectual property may seem at odds 
– opposite of reasoning and analytical discourse. For one, intellectual property rights are about 
exclusivity and monopoly rights, and Rawlsian principles of justice are about a liberal (social) and 
fair (economic) society: fire and water don’t mix. However, this section of the article is arguing that 
that is not the case, and there is systemic unity in framing intellectual property in Rawlsian principles 
of justice; or at least, Rawls theory on pluralism, in order to defend the rights in intellectual property, 
and to link those rights to Hohfeldian concepts of rights in property. Thus, the central premise is that 
there is a right to rights in intellectual property.  
                                                             
65 Rawls (n 1).  
66 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993). 
67 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: With “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (HUP, 1999). 
68 Eg, Darryl Murphy, “Are Intellectual Property Rights Compatible with Rawlsian Principles of Justice?” (2012) 14 
Ethics of Information Technology 109; David Resnik, “A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property” (2003) 46 Journal 
of Business Ethics 319. My reference to intellectual property here is also an indirect reference to private property and it 
must be borne in mind that the philosophical articulation of rights is in general, a broad reference to private property, see 
Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism (Routledge, 1999) 59 (discussing property rights).  
69 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (HUP, 1971) 60. However, in Political Liberalism, Rawls made slight alteration to the 
wordings of his “first principle”: “each person has an equal right to fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which 
is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all,” 291. The second Rawlsian principle states that: “social and 
economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members 
of society,” 291.  
70 Rawls (1993) 136.  
71 Rawls (1971); Rawls (1993).  In Political Liberalism, Rawls’s discussion on the basic structure of society, in a way, 
represents his views on property, however, given that property proper was not central to Rawls’s discussion, but his 
allusion to personal property and democracy like property suggests that it was difficult to avoid that discussion, and 
therefore, rights on personal property is a basic liberty. See Benjamin Barros, “Property and Freedom” (2009) 4 New York 
University Journal of Law and Liberty 36, 58 – 59. I do believe that Rawls by design in discussing liberties and 
constitutional like democracy already assumed property to be part of the foundational system and therefore there was no 
need to go into great elaborations. Had Rawls been writing about non-constitutional democracies (eg a Soviet Utopian 
state) then he would have needed to address property proper.  
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A final point worth mentioning is that although my focus will be on Rawls political liberalism in 
general, this does not mean that I am excluding Rawlsian distributive justice and fairness. On the 
contrary, Rawlsian notions of distributive justice and fairness are also incorporated into the argument 
as they form part of the broader Rawlsian approach. However, to make the argument containable, a 
focus on political liberalism allows for examining pluralism in general and the way it can be 
connected to intellectual property rights in the international legal discourse. Moreover, Political 
Liberalism, is generally seen as an extension of Rawls earlier works that addressed the theoretical 
conceptions of justice and fairness initially set out in Theory of Justice, but, more specifically, it also 
addressed in more detail pluralism. Thus, when contrasting both works, arguable, in Theory of Justice, 
Rawls stressed on some form of moral justification for justice and fairness, but in Political Liberalism, 
he approached those same theories in a more realistic manner (albeit under the normative diagnosis 
of the political space). In other words, liberalism is better justified in a political sense as opposed to 
a philosophical sense.  
One of Rawls claim is that justice and fairness is built on the foundation of a pluralistic framework 
supported by freestanding political liberalism.72 The politic, like the legal space, dominates a 
multitude of views that are often in conflict; and only some form of peaceful coexistence can 
deescalate the conflict. Providing a practical analysis of that political space (politic) through pluralism 
therefore, is one methodological form of conflict resolution. Given that Rawls political space is a 
narrative on parallels with Western democracies (where property rights are engrained in democratic 
values) then the political space is a liberal one where rights are in abundance and supplements the 
operations of the political space (the state). Rights in this Rawlsian political space requires the 
existence of Hohfeldian jural relations because for Rawls, the liberal political space endorses the rule 
of law that are essential to maintaining social cohesion and also laws that protect (property) rights for 
the benefit of society where stability is preferred over instability. It is in light of this why, in Political 
Liberalism, Rawls modified, what he had already developed in Theory of Justice, to argue that: 
“measures are required to assure that the basic needs of all citizens can be met so that they can take 
part in political and social life.”73 So, liberalism for Rawls, as commentators, have pointed out, 
corresponds to the ideals of the good life in a liberal political order with a neutral state with the 
freedom to choose.74  
If, in Theory of Justice, Rawls mission was to offer the proper elements on the moral foundations of 
justice and fairness as broad as possible, then, in Political Liberalism, the concept of justice was 
reduced to a more manageable form of the political space. Thus, while, Rawls advocated for a 
comprehensive pluralistic framework of justice in Political Liberalism, he was also wary, that, for 
the continued success of rights in society, regulations were necessary to guarantee the freedom of 
rights. This therefore equates to how the freedom of rights that socially mobile citizens enjoy in a 
liberal political space and the obligation of the political and administrative order in the political space 
to provide rules on the enjoyment of property to ensure that there is a right to have rights75 in a just 
society with various social arrangements and economic value paradigms.  
                                                             
72 Rawls, in part, argues: “political liberalism supposes that there are many conflicting reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines […] This reasonable plurality of conflicting and incommensurable doctrines is seen as the characteristic work 
of practical reason over time under enduring free institutions”, Political Liberalism (1993) 135.  
73 Rawls (1993) 166.  
74 Percy Lehning, “Liberalism and Capabilities: Theories of Justice and the Neutral State” (1990) 4 Social Justice 
Research 187.  
75 My reference to the rights to have rights is in a corporate context – that is the owners of intellectual property rights that 
are mostly corporate entities to which individual is only a part of; see Linda Tannehill and Morris Tannehill, The Market 
for Liberty (Lansing: Michigan, 1970); Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal (Signet Books, 1966) chapter 11: 




In essence the Rawlsian principle of pluralism essentially means that in a democratic society where 
economic goods flourishes all members of society can benefit. Given that Rawls excluded a proper 
discussion on property in his theories, then, it is how Rawls formulates the basic structure of society 
and pluralism that opens the gateway to argue that the connection of society’s basic structure are 
inextricably linked to individuals in society to exercise or claim rights in property. In other words, 
Rawls, turn to the property and the rights that are associated with real property, or as he refers to it, 
“basic structure”, to argue that beyond justice and fairness in the liberal political space, a regulatory 
framework is needed to guarantee those rights. Rawls argues that “although society may reasonably 
rely on a large element of pure procedural justice in determining distributive shares, a conception of 
justice must incorporate an ideal form for the basic structure.”76 This might be conceived as separating 
utopian (justice and fairness) from pragmatism (private law rules) in relation to the rights that, in a 
Rawlsian society, all members are free to enjoy primary goods. The members of a Rawlsian society 
are “reasonable persons” and part of that reasonableness enables them to accept some form of 
reasonable pluralism such as legislative rights in property protection or the legitimacy of justice.  
Now, let us consider that in a Rawlsian society, for the sake of argument, there are only barbarians 
and no reasonable person. At the same time, in this hypothetical Rawlsian society, property is 
abundant, but no form of legislative rules exists to guarantee the rights in property. Would this mean 
that the barbarians would use custom to provide for the legitimate rights in the ownership of property? 
This scenario is likely, and the barbarians, in this hypothetical Rawlsian society are also like the 
reasonable man in the normal Rawlsian society. The Rawlsian reasonable man and his barbarian 
counterpart are economic actors bounded by a form of “social self-determination”77 and common 
factors that mixes, political, social, authority, individual freedoms and Hohfeldian rights. Thus, what 
Political Liberalism does, is that it enunciates how formal rules can coexist with fairness and justice 
in a society that embraces various hierarchal norms – the pluralistic framework.    
To better illustrate Rawlsian pluralistic framework in the context of intellectual property, snippets 
from the courts or tribunals is necessary. In various cases in domestic courts, higher courts, or 
international tribunals, some rulings have referred to Rawlsian theory: not as the overall reasoning 
for their rulings, but as part of the fundamental role of Rawlsian theory on the judicial sphere. For 
example, Rawlsian conception of justice and fairness, or at least, when interpreted as procedural and 
equal opportunity, has been invoked in WTO cases such as EC – Sardines (2002);78 US – Frozen 
Lamb;79 and Canada – Civilian Aircraft.80 These instances of fairness in the WTO are to be seen from 
a libertarian liberalism perspective where the core concern is equal opportunity and procedural 
fairness. A further way of looking at these WTO instances of fairness is from the perspective that 
fairness as a concept is vague and broad and can also be incorporated within other principles  such as 
good faith.81  Outside of the WTO, early Rawlsian liberalism has also been invoked in Repetti v Gill82 
signalling how serious the courts took the Rawlsian principles in their early formation. However, it 
is at the international level that the significance of Rawlsian principles carries more weight. One can 
ponder whether Rawlsian principles of justice and fairness is applicable to the debates on international 
intellectual property rights – but the tribunals do not directly address those questions. But a more vital 
                                                             
76 Rawls (1993) 281.  
77 Ross Zucker, “Whose Property is it Anyway? The Social Nature of Economic Actors and Egalitarian Remuneration” 
(1995) 7 Review of Political Economy 375, 383.  
78 European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, (2002) [140]. 
79 United States – Safegurad Measure on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb from New Zealand, WT/DS177/AB/R; 
WT/DS178/AB/R (2001) [115]. 
80 Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R (1999) [190]. 
81 Eg, Marion Panizzon, “Fairness, Promptness and Effectives: How the Openness of Good Faith Limits the Flexibility 
of the DSU” (2008) 77 Nordic Journal of International Law 275; Thomas Frank, Fairness in International Law and 
Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
82 Repetti v Gill, 372 NYS 2d 840, 848 (1975). 
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question is whether Rawlsian principles justify the legitimacy or determines property rights in the 
international intellectual property regime?  
That was a scenario that the WTO  had to deal with in the Plain Packaging disputes,  whether the 
owners (investors) of trademarks had a legitimate interest in their investments (property).83Thus, the 
issue of legitimacy is tied to many factors. In fact, one of Rawls’ core concern relates to legitimacy 
in the pluralistic political framework that he advocates.84 For Rawls, in a pluralistic society where 
people are reasonable, rules are able to justify the legitimacy of the political framework providing 
that such rules are publicly accepted (the participation of all members of society).85  Yet, despite this 
prognosis, objections to intellectual property in the international legal regime is robust; and often, 
lack crucial insights into the content of the law relating to intellectual property or, the right to have 
rights in international intellectual property, when seen from Hohfeldian or Rawlsian perspectives. 
From Rawlsian pluralistic liberalism, the connection between international intellectual property and 
the rules of the international legal regime represents progress in democratic society and idealism that 
every participant in society can operate, participate and make economic contributions based on the 
constitutive elements of rules that are in the international legal regime. That is what I meant by 
constitution-like rules as alluded to.  
The various developments in international law over the past century represents a legal pluralistic 
order where different and competing participants in society can lay a claim of rights-rule that 
advances their economic interests and contributions to society. The result of such claims to rights-
rule are what Rawls envisage in the first place: fairness, justice and legitimation of the international 
political order that helps to create the rules in the first place. In this regard, a fair account of rules in 
the international intellectual property order will take into consideration the pluralistic nature of 
Rawlsian fairness and justice and a Hohfeldian rights-claims system and the various legitimising acts 
of international law. Seen from this perspective, then justice and fairness, is not only for the benefits 
of “unequal peoples” in society but also extends to the significant economic participants that are the 
owners of property (including intellectual property) who have a claim to rights – the right to have 
rights in international intellectual property. It is in this spirit that Rawlsian political liberalism 
embraces the nature of a free market society where rules enacted by the political authority either at 
the international level and state level are justifiable. As such, Rawlsian liberalism represents “an 
outcome of the application of the liberal principle of legitimacy and the notion of public reason it 
expresses, given the fact of reasonable pluralism.”86 Thus, the existence of rules in a society also 
enables the participants in that society to be rational human beings.  
Moreover, it should always be considered that questions on the internationalness of intellectual 
property reflects the very pluralistic framework Rawls developed given that the world is a mult itude 
of economic participants, where the basic structure involves a form of Hohfeldian right-claim in 
property.87 In this regard, the existence of an international system of enforceable intellectual property 
rules with rights-claims captures rights to property in a domestic context and the implication of 
                                                             
83 Australia – Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging 
Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WT/DS/435/R, WT/DS441/R, WT/DS458/R, 
WT/DS467/R, 28 June 2018 [7.1925] [7.2429].  
84 Rawls (1993) 137.  
85 Enzo Rossi, “Legitimacy, Democracy and Public Justification: Rawls’s Political Liberalism versus Gaus’ Justificatory 
Liberalism” (2014) 20 Res Publica 9, 12.  
86 Berys Gaut, “Rawls and the Claims of Liberal Legitimacy” (1995) 24 Philosophical Papers 1, 5.  
87 Eg, David Douglas, “Towards a Just and Fair Internet: Applying Rawls’ Principles of Justice to Internet Regulation” 
(2015) 17 Ethics and Informational Technology 57; Kurt Burch, “Intellectual Property Rights and the Culture of Global 
Liberalism” (1995) 17 Science Communication 214; Martha Nussbaum, “Political Liberalism and Global Justice” (2015) 
11 Journal of Global Ethics 68 (transposing Rawlsian political liberalism beyond the nation state).  
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property rights beyond the domestic state.88 In this way, then, Political Liberalism endorses and 
harmonises, what are also pronounced in international human rights instruments, such as the United 
Nations Declaration on Human Rights (UNDHR), including the rights to private property and the 
right to liberty.  
Given that almost all of the crucial elements of the Rawlsian egalitarian navigator has been technically 
discussed, Rawlsian approach to intellectual property still remains semi-chartered territory. Yet, that 
is not a result of lack of attempts, but rather, because of the difficulties in framing Rawlsian approach 
to intellectual property against the rights regime in the international legal plane. To better understand 
Rawls in the intellectual property regime requires that one should be able to diagnose Rawls views 
on property, as part of the greater political liberal system where rules exists, citizens enjoy freedoms, 
and a right to (personal) property.89 From this perspective, the Rawlsian approach to intellectual 
property entails not only distributive justice, fairness and pluralism, but also encompass Hohfeldian 
concepts of rights (including Lockean). Moreover, Rawlsian approach to intellectual property, as I 
framed it, converges with how economic participants (individuals) in a liberal society rely on rules 
that ensure fair distribution applies to the right to engage in economic production (rights owners). It 
is for that reason why the shift in international intellectual property occurred in the TRIPS regime (as 
opposed to the pre-TRIPS era) and provided for a “new-egalitarian-Rawlsian –international 
instrument,”90 even though the TRIPs era of international intellectual property law had been subject 
to much criticism that failed to take into account – the content and context of rules that guarantee the 
right to have rights in intellectual property. In other words, modern international law has expanded 
to cover a pluralistic system of rights that includes the rights of (intellectual) property.  
The pluralistic framework that  Rawls paints suggests  a fundamental structure where rights and 
obligations are essential to the market for goods that enables economic producers to be creative, 
productive and socially progressive. That market is competitive and full of various economic 
producers and economic participants where the ownership of property represents “reasonable 
plurality of conflicting and incommensurable doctrines”91 and as such, for Rawls, regulatory 
measures  guarantees justice, fairness, rights. This is regardless of the goods in the market as 
regulations and rights allows for a fair pursuit of economic participation. Thus, in a Rawlsian sense, 
the rights in intellectual property represents global social progress that began when John Speyer 
obtained the earliest known patent in 1469 that allowed him to enjoy “exclusive printing privileges 
in Venetian territory, and forbade the importation of competing books of foreign imprint”92 to the 
legitimate rights of trademark owners in the plain packaging of cigarettes nowadays.93 Thus, with the 
expansion and progress of intellectual property in contemporary times, the fundamental question is 
whether intellectual property is justified, and if so, what are the theories for the justification of modern 
intellectual property, and how do the theories measure up against the liberalism of Locke and Rawls, 
or the Hohfeldian concepts of rights-claim. The next section address some of these questions, 
primarily looking at Robert Merges’ book that emerges from the Rawlsian debate on the pluralistic 
framework of liberalism.  
                                                             
88 Eg, P. Sean Morris, “Beyond Trade: Global Digital Exhaustion in International Economic Regulation” (2013) 36 
Campbell Law Review 107.  
89 Rawls (1993) 298 discussing personal property. 
90 Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, “The Hidden Though Flourishing Justification of Intellectual Property Laws: Distributive 
Justice, National versus International Approaches” (2017) 21 Lewis and Clark Law Review 1, 30.  
91 Rawls (n 72); Robert Cooter, “Freedom, Creativity, and Intellectual Property” (2013) 8 New York University Journal 
of law and Liberty 1 (arguing that economic freedoms should be legalize through intellectual property law).   
92 Bruce Bugbee, Genesis of American Patent and Copyright Law (Washington DC, 1967) 21, as cited in, Adam Moore, 
“Intellectual Property: Theory, Privilege, and Pragmatism” (2003) 16 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 191; 
see also, David Resnik, “Fair Drug Prices and the Patent System” (2004) 12 Health Care Analysis 91 (using Rawls to 
defend fairness in the international patent system under the TRIPS). 
93 See (n 83). 
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3. Justifying private rights in intellectual property: Merges, pluralism and proportionality 
 
How could a rural Indiana farmer who planted genetically modified seeds be the subject of a litigation 
by a giant corporation for infringing intellectual property rights? And more importantly, are there any 
rights in seeds (genetically modified or other) that belongs solely to an individual (or corporation) 
when seeds are technically, abundant in nature, or even if genetically modified seeds are a self-
reproducing product? As it stands, the answer to these questions (legal and biological) can be found 
in how the intellectual property regime allocate rights for invention, innovation and discoveries under 
the patent system. Thus, in Bowman v Monsanto94 the US Supreme Court was faced with whether the 
patents of Monsanto were infringed when Bowman harvested patented soybeans from an initial 
planting and then reused seeds from the original planting. The Court held that the Indiana farmer 
infringed the patent rights of Monsanto as the patent exhaustion doctrine did not allow the farmer to 
replant the seeds.95  
The illustration of the Bowman v Monsanto case reflects the broader intellectual property regime 
where private rights in intellectual property are concerned and how the law – private law, to which 
the intellectual property rules are a part – justify the right to have rights. There are two broad questions 
that are important for the purposes of this section – are intellectual property rights justifiable, and 
secondly, to inquire, rather briefly, if “justice and efficiency”96 in intellectual property are tools that 
allows for private rights to legitimise (public) international law for the legitimate interests of 
intellectual property owners. However, this part of the article is concerned mostly in answering the 
first question, although, the second, will be addressed in part, at the end of this section. But to address 
the first question, it is necessary to put in context its relationship with Hohfeldian concepts of rights 
and Rawlsian liberalism in intellectual property as I sketched out in the sections above.  
A significant part of the analysis (and the answer) however lies in the book – Justifying Intellectual 
Property by Robert Merges – that gives a modern interpretation (twenty-first century) on the 
justification and ethical foundations of intellectual property rights both in the Rawlsian sense of 
distributive justice/liberalism and also, prior liberal philosophical theories of property rights.97 
Building on various themes Merges’ work has shone the light of justice on intellectual property and 
provides strong theoretical commentary on private rights in intellectual property. The book is an 
interwoven collage of the philosophic traditions of Kant (individual freedoms), Locke (justification 
for appropriation), and Rawls (distributive justice and liberalism) as the bedrock that support property 
rights norms in intellectual property.98 Yet, it is a book where one of the leading disciples of modern 
law and economics methodological studies of private law (to include intellectual property) rejects 
utilitarianism in search for an alternate discourse to justify intellectual property and heard his calling, 
through the philosophical and ethical discourse of pluralism. Merges is generally a strong advocate 
of a utilitarian approach (the economic maximisation of intellectual property for societal benefit) to 
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Intellectual Property” (2012) 14 Ethics and Informational Technology 169; Ikechi Mgbeoji, “Book Review: Justifying 
Intellectual Property, by Robert P. Merges” (2012) 50 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 291. 
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intellectual property as evidence by his law and economics methodology in other works.99 But, in this 
book, Merges rejects the utilitarian justification of intellectual property partly because of its 
complexity and failure to demonstrate with solid empirical evidence that can reasonably justify 
intellectual property. Merges argue that the justification of intellectual property is better explained by 
the strong philosophical and liberal traditions through Locke, Kant and Rawls, and develops his own 
theory through a liberal theory (pluralism) that better justifies the intellectual property regime.  
The thrust of Merges’ book is to advance a set of theories, in which, intellectual property operates 
freely, without being underpinned by any singular foundation. In this vein, Merges argues that a 
number of mid-level principles, namely: efficiency, non-removal (from the public domain), dignity 
and proportionality are the pluralistic framework that justifies intellectual property and not the 
common straight-faced utilitarianism justification all too familiar (especially in Anglo-American 
theories). Of the four principles that Merges’ advocates he place great emphasis on proportionality – 
as the core foundational principle with legal and practical relevance for intellectual property.  
I will shortly return to Merges’ treatment of pluralism.  
Merges’ liberal theory is drawn from the principal elements of Rawls’s own form of liberalism (1971 
and 1991) but, at the same time, appears to have close connection to those of Resnik who developed 
similar theories, based in part on Rawlsian principles.100 For Merges, intellectual property are basic 
rights “even if IP protection leads to some distributional unfairness, society should still include it 
among the basic rights to which all are entitled.”101 In this context, Merges’ adoption of a fairness 
approach to intellectual property is inextricably link to rights – no matter how those rights are claimed: 
whether in intellectual property, real property, or the constitutional- like nature of rights at the 
international level. Seen differently, rights, or claims to rights, are of a higher omnipotent structure, 
so much so, that its very foundation is built upon a liberal spread of eligible claims to rights. For this 
reason, Merges has no other option but to assign intellectual property rights to that omnipotent and 
all-encompassing structure, though basic at its foundation, it is liberal because “creative labor is 
valuable and important.”102 This strong advocacy of intellectual property rights, through a legalisation 
process of the state (property rights), allow Merges to trace through the historical and philosophical 
pages of Kant, Locke and Rawlsian liberal theory to justify intellectual property rights from a 
pluralistic perspective.103  
It is not unnatural for a firm believer in God to reject his teachings and embraces the plurality of 
atheism. In some ways, this is exactly what Merges (an apparent avid Christian) did when he rejected 
utilitarianism for pluralism in his book. Of the four mid-level principles that Merges’ developed, he 
devoted an entire chapter to proportionality. So, what does this tells us? Has intellectual property 
suddenly found a new faith, and all the other foundations, especially that steeped in utilitarianism was 
wrong? Not really. But alternatives exist.  
In addressing pluralism, Merges argues that “strong IP protection encourages and facilitates a wide 
variety of approaches – including various degrees of openness – without mandating or coercing any 
single approach.”104 Intellectual property is a collection of various regimes (copyrights, patents, 
trademarks, etc.) and is open up to new regimes as they interact with the traditional areas of 
intellectual property. At the same time, the rights, scope and obligations under the various regimes of 
intellectual property continues to expand and are also redefined by the courts as they determine how 
                                                             
99 Eg, Robert Merges, “Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics” (2000) 53 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 1857.  
100 Resnik (n 68); Resnik (n 92); Pila (n 98) 188. 
101 Merges (n 20) 112.  
102 Ibid, 293 (explaining the relevance of IP rights).  
103 Ibid, 110. 
104 Ibid, 238. 
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those rights, scope and obligations correspond to domestic laws on intellectual property and the policy 
objectives of those intellectual property laws. From this perspective, Merges is correct to view the 
intellectual property regime as open and rich with diversity. But where does this endorsement of 
strong intellectual property protection converge with proportionality as developed by Merges? First, 
let us look at how Merges define proportionality.105 In fact, for Merges, there is no definition of 
proportionality,106 (proportionality, however, for Merges “is a transcendent principle that ties together 
all manner of disparate situations”107). Rather, Merges identifies proportionality as an under-theorised 
mid-level principle that partly entails intellectual property rights that are fair and reward owners and 
inventors returns based on the market. In other words, proportionality, in Merges world, preaches a 
degree of efficiency and fairness based on the market “where the idea of rewards proportioned to 
effort or value.”108  Merges, the disciple that rejected utilitarianism in intellectual property, has found 
his way – a born again, and embraces “the utilitarianism of efficiency”. Well, at least, that is how it 
seems in Merges’ discussion on proportionality. Yet, it is not quite so. Merges suggest that under the 
proportionality principle, the government (and the courts) have a right to intervene in the transactions 
of intellectual property to correct undue leverage or “radical imbalances that may emerge.”109 The 
courts he argue may modify “the entitlement structure of already-issued IP rights”110 and the 
government can make “postgrant rights adjustments”111 that correlates with fairness in property rights 
as originally developed in Lockean, Kantian and Rawlsian fashion.  One understanding of Merges’ 
proportionality discussion is that he advocates both for legal and social approaches to intellectual 
property where the systems like nature of intellectual property is different. Naturally, this 
interpretation is reminiscent of systems theory that made its way into legal analysis in recent years112 
and perhaps, Merges had in mind systems theory when he diplomatically opposed the impossibility 
of defending “a legal system that permits grossly distorted transactions.”113 Nevertheless, what is 
however significant from Merges’ theorising of proportionality is that important questions in relation 
to proportionality in international intellectual property instruments are unavoidable,114 and it is those 
questions that makes Merges’ work an important dialogue in the international ideology of intellectual 
property rights.  
One of the significance of Merges’ work is that it provides a useful theoretical channel for which 
analytical debate on intellectual property can be conducted. Moreover, for my own purposes, there is 
even little to disagree with Merges’ on (except perhaps he sometimes contradicts his own 
reasoning)115 given that we both share the same objective – the defence of intellectual property from 
the unfair treatment it has received. For Merges’ that defence is from the ethical and philosophical 
traditions of property rights and the variety or pluralistic space that can justify intellectual property. 
                                                             
105 Ibid, chapter 6; 159 – 191, 181 (setting out one definition of proportionality).  
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107 Ibid, 162. 
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In other words, intellectual property can be justified on many grounds. For my own purposes, that 
defence is through the system of international law which serves the legitimate interests of intellectual 
property rights holders in contemporary society; and which, incidentally, reflects the more than six 
hundred years history of intellectual property (mostly copyright and patents). Merges’ work may not 
have fully convinced all the critics116 however, there is room to engage with Merges’ thoughts to 
unravel the complexity of rights in intellectual property in the international system. This is further 
supported by the fact that part of Merges’ deliberations were based in part on the work of Rawlsian 
distributive justice and liberalism and the societal benefits that are still available even if such property 
rights at the international level are exclusive. Merges’ for instance, argues that intellectual property 
should not be seen only as social utility but also fundamental rights that are to be taken seriously as 
ownership in intellectual property “represents a societal reward for effort and creative work”117 and 
“permits people to show that they are deserving in the first place.”118 My own attempt to transpose 
the triad of liberal intellectuals (Locke, Hohfeld and Rawls) on the international intellectual property 
system, is not the same approach as Merges’ for domestic intellectual property through a 
philosophical discourse. Rather, I interpret Merges and the forbearers of property liberalism to include 
the scope of international law. Moreover, unlike Merges whose discussion is mostly about copyrights 
and patents – I sometimes invoke the modern intellectual property regime of trademark law and policy 
to extrapolate its liberal agenda and its defence of the legitimate interests of rights (trademarks as 
investments as seen in the plain packaging cases at the WTO). By turning to trademark law and policy 
in the international legal system affords intellectual property to be seen not only under the historic 
elements of patents and copyrights but how the legitimate interests in trademarks reflects the 
pluralistic structure that Merges advocates due to the “multidimensional”119 nature of trademark 
law.120 
Merges theory of pluralism is one of his key argument. It is also a theory that I find support for given 
that the modern market for intellectual property at the international level contain more players (rights 
owners) than the domestic market for intellectual property.121 Merges does not dismiss the classic 
libertarian argument for rights such as Locke and Rawls – rather he embraces them and argue that 
there is still more space for other players in a democratic marketplace that is based on property rights. 
Merges suggest that this marketplace can accommodate new entrants as part of the pluralistic system 
of rights that justifies intellectual property. Merges’ arguments are conducive to the ideological nature 
of international intellectual property because rights in intellectual property have now shift from the 
singular domain of the nation state to the global level where there are multiple players in intellectual 
property.  
The regime of international intellectual property allows for the advancement of interests and rules to 
protect those interests at the international level, and thereby, creating a cosmic domain of rules and 
rights. In this cosmic domain, the various regimes of intellectual property are brought together 
through harmonising treaties such as the TRIPs Agreement and institutions such as the WIPO. Seen 
from a pluralistic perspective, international rules in intellectual property (TRIPS Agreement) and 
institutions such as the WIPO promotes similar agendas, however, what differentiates them is the 
need to support and promote pluralism in the intellectual property space and the various ideological 
agendas that forms part of that pluralistic space. Thus, rules and ideologies can blend  to create 
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harmonisation in what would otherwise be a chaotic system. Therefore, Merges theory on pluralism 
supports a democratic market space that promote  various rights thereby justifying other rights in that 
market space.  
An essential advancement of the pluralism theory is that harmonising rules and various actors can 
innovate and produce new goods that supports society in general but fall back on the foundational 
core of a democratic society – rights in property. Rights in property within a pluralistic marketspace 
provides for the owners of intellectual property to innovate and develop a fairer and diverse society 
with spill over benefits for other societies so that harmonisation can take place through new rights 
paradigms. Merges’ theory of intellectual pluralism reflects this new rights paradigm with both 
normative and justificatory arguments in intellectual property. Furthermore, Merges’ theory can also 
be a response to the developments in the international economic system – where similar ideologies 
of rights are based on the domestic notion of rights in property. As such, the international intellectual 
property regime has a  rights foundations that is  synonymous to rights in real property  at the domestic 
level and offers fertile ground to promote pluralism in international intellectual property.  
D. Between sovereignty and consensus: the role of “rights” in international intellectual property 
 
In this section I will synthesise the argument that rights in the international intellectual property 
system reinforces the complex trajectories and competing interests of states and rights owners. I frame 
the argument under three sub-sections: (1) ideology of rights from the perspective of international 
intellectual property; (2) proportionality in the context of Merges justification theory and (3) 
intellectual property rights as a leverage consensus point due to the competing interests of intellectual 
property that the TRIPS recognise.  
The discussions in these sub-sections of the article are not based on technical legal argumentation, 
rather, they are based on the context of the philosophical traditions of rights in property as set out in 
the previous sections of the article. What we have seen so far in this article is that, the traditional, and 
modern justification of (intellectual) property rights, are based on pluralistic liberal accounts of the 
market, and the societal elements where rights are respected and grounded in law. This all-inclusive 
domain of rights shapes the way the economies of nation states evolve. From this point of view, the 
all-inclusive domain of rights contains characteristics and structural elements that are welcoming to 
other forms of rights that builds upon the basic elements of democratic liberalism and market 
pluralism. New forms of rights such as intellectual property that enters the all-inclusive domain of 
rights function alongside the basic elements, but, at the same time, advance their own interests and 
visions, of market participation, to the extent, that the state allows via regulatory means the 
exclusivity to own/protect intellectual property. Hence – state powers to legislate in intellectual 
property and democratic rules of market participation allow rights owners to develop norms and 
ideologies that are appropriate for their own individual agendas and interests in the market. Under 
these circumstances the territorial coverage of the market is not relevant – as, it can be domestic, or 
beyond the state borders (international). Therefore, if the market for intellectual property goods is a 
domestic one – rights owners participate at the will of that market with assurances from the state on 
the protection of their goods and ownership in such goods. However, the participation of the rights 
owners beyond the borders of the nation state (at the international level) requires some form of 
uniformity to engage in the global market where multiple players participate in the market.  
In the modern context – the uniformity is in the form of international institutions such as the TRIPS 
Agreement under the WTO. At this level, legal assurances are given that, like the domestic market, 
the owners of intellectual property goods are protected and supported by a central authority in which 
rights owners can advance their agendas under common rules. The market for intellectual property 
goods at the international level is also all-inclusive based on democratic inclusion and foundations of 
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property rights without discrimination. But participation at the international level also requires market 
participants to be fair and proportionate in how they leverage their individual agendas and interests 
in intellectual property. In this regard, standard arguments of rights (firmly entrenched at the domestic 
level) spill over to the international level as part of the ideological foundations of international 
intellectual property.  
1. The ideology of rights in international intellectual property 
 
In this first part of the section I want to bring together the views explored in the previous sections 
(Lockean, Hohfeld and Rawls) to understand the nature of rights in international intellectual property. 
But the discussion here is not a rehash of those views, rather the Lockean, Hohfeldian, Rawlsian and 
Mergesian justification views, for which, I am labelling the new libertarian rights – primarily from 
the perspective of corporate ownership of intellectual property – to argue or support the right to have 
rights in intellectual property.122  
This ideological defence of intellectual property rights that I am arguing for in this section is relevant 
in order to later examine the international rules and intellectual property. In other words, does 
international intellectual property rules recognise rights in intellectual property within some form of 
reasonable interest or legitimate interest? That question is later addressed in this section of the article 
– but for now – the situation of rights in international intellectual property stems from how rights in 
the local context are seen. Rights theories in a  domestic context is based on  rights from a property 
perspective  generates  domestic innovation and economic growth that benefits society. As seen 
above, these rights are often part of a free market system that is democratic (and guarantee social and 
property rights). As demonstrated earlier, intellectual property rights are rights that individuals are 
entitled to when seen within the broader rights arguments,123 but also, rights in intellectual property 
are owned by corporate entities that are better able to navigate the power of the state and its regulation 
of domestic intellectual property and international legal relations for intellectual property. Thus, 
rights, as part of the free market ideology – the new libertarianism of global intellectual property – 
are essential to the modern world of global commerce. Off course, when the idea of rights in 
intellectual property are raised in any discussion, the things that sprung to mind for most people 
relates to rights to medicines that are covered by patents, or, the rights to technology necessary for 
development. What is often ignored in this debate are the rights of the intellectual property owner to 
earn the reward of their intellectual labour as per the theories of Locke, Rawls and Merges. This is 
important because those private rights were not as a result of a public common endeavour, but, rather 
of “a man’s right to the product of his mind.”124 In this scenario, the owner asserts his private rights 
that are guaranteed through the power of the state in the form of patents, copyrights or trademarks.  
The discussions above (Lockean, Rawlsian and Mergesian) shows a continuity on the various 
ideologies of rights in free market societies; and that rights in intellectual property are justified as part 
of the system of private law that governs property. An important observation about that sequence of 
discussions, or at least, my analysis of them, is that no form of dissent emerged. Rather, one ideology 
of rights builds upon the other, to demonstrate that private rights are grounded in the economic fabric 
of society. As a result of this continuity – private rights guarantee fairness to both economic producers 
(rights holders) and economic participants (individuals). That fairness in private rights, the continuity 
of liberal thoughts on rights in private property and as a result, the justification of intellectual property, 
all contributes to the new libertarianism of global intellectual property. It is because of the ideas of 
private rights that “the law establishes the property of a mind”125 that enable a nation to implement 
                                                             
122 See Rand (n 75) on rights in intellectual property.  
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid.  
22 
 
“the optimal level of intellectual property rights.”126 In this context, modern intellectual property rules 
simply responds to the different forms of rights in trademark, copyright and patent regimes as part of 
the ideological tradition on the continuity of private rights.127 What the new libertarianism reflects is 
that intellectual property are not treated exclusively in economic terms, but rather, a philosophical 
justification of the social value on the market for liberty in goods and ideas. The new libertarianism 
of intellectual property does not totally reject economic efficiency or the utilitarian justification of 
intellectual property, but, as part of the continuity argument, embraces the transactional role that 
private rights play in the social relations of society.  In other words, as part of the social relations of 
intellectual property the liberal ecology of modern property rights allows for other ideological 
defences to be embraced.128 This is because the creation of private rights in intellectual property 
brings societal benefits for economic participants and economic producers and defending these 
private rights from a singular ideology would mean the exclusion of reasonable and legitimate 
interests in intellectual property.  
The right to private property for economic producers (rights owners) enables economic participants 
(individuals) to aspire and engage in the states’ own ideological goals, and in the modern context, the 
ideological goals of states are increasingly full participation in trade and commerce.  
Modern global trade is multidimensional as various legal relations are created by states among states, 
and by states among private enterprises (individualism). Asserting private rights in this (global) 
pluralistic legal arena requires the invocation of two sets of rights (or claims) to private property. The 
first assertion is the right to the intellectual creation as guarantee under the states’ domestic 
jurisdiction (patent law for example). The second assertion of private rights requires the international 
recognition of domestic private rights in intellectual creations through rules that all nation states in 
the global market place for intellectual creations recognises (example the TRIPS Agreement). Under 
these circumstances, the primary actors are not the states nor the economic participants (rights 
owners), rather, the main actor is private rights in property as it traverses the domestic to the 
international. States and rights owners role are only to be invoked in this global pluralistic legal arena 
when those rights are breached. Therefore, if private rights in property are seen as the main actor, 
then, the justification of such private rights in (intellectual) property ought to take into account the 
benefits for owning this right, separately from any consequences of breaches of this right. Because 
this right exists in a multidimensional space of several players, that right is further justified through 
the ideological arguments on the continuity of private rights (Lockean, Rawls, and Merges) as part of 
a broader new libertarian agenda of international rules.   
Therefore, as Merges argued, the justification of intellectual property rights should be open to other 
ideologies. Merges’ arguments for the justification of intellectual property rights are not that different 
from Locke or Rawls – he simply refined those ideological traditions to form a continuous pattern 
that fits contemporary society where intellectual property have expanded to cover various subjects 
and objects. Part of that ideological continuity is being reflected in the TRIPS Agreement in that it 
embraces the new libertarian of rights for intellectual property owners to assert their private rights 
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beyond the borders of their nation states. What the international rules to private rights in intellectual 
property represents is a set of complex contents on the ideology on property relations; a system of 
rights-claim provisio; the obligation of states to respond to breaches of private enterprises 
(individualism) rights, and the role of private property in contemporary freedom of rights and (global) 
market freedoms. Because intellectual property in the contemporary world are no longer limited to a 
single state – the assertion of private rights beyond state boundaries relies on the complex contents 
of property relations in the international system. One notable element in this complex content of 
property relations is a free market that essentially acts as a unifying element of the various complex 
property relations.129  
In one area where the ideology of private rights in intellectual property is perhaps – an under-theorised 
field – is the tobacco industry. The theories and practicalities of intellectual property in the tobacco 
industry is even more complicated by the fact that only the trademark regime is applicable – in that 
only trademarks are used for the identification of various brands of cigarettes. Another factor that 
complicates matter in the tobacco industry and the property rights ideology is, also, the fact that, 
trademarks are not sufficiently addressed in the literature the same way as copyrights and patents 
from the perspective of property rights regime. Moreover, in the context of the justification of 
intellectual property rights, trademarks are difficult to justify in the same fashion as patents or 
copyrights from the innovation and competitiveness paradigm. The justification of trademarks is 
actually a more recent phenomenon – to signal quality and convey information, to “promote the 
expansion of economic activity beyond national borders.”130 For the new global economy – 
trademarks more concrete function is to serve the ideals of a market liberalism – investments. Thus, 
these are the underlying ideologies and justification of trademarks and the rules that support the 
property function in modern trademarks.131  
The tobacco industry represents the convergence of the ideology of intellectual property in the sense 
that rights in trademarks are asserted over the commodification of product property where legitimate 
investments are made in property (tobacco) that brings societal benefits (economic). From the private 
rights perspective, intellectual property now represents a modification of the legal norms that are in 
private and public law. That modification starts to emerge even more when states interact beyond 
their national borders over the rights in private property that are represented by the domestic 
trademark regime in intellectual property. This new territory in which the ideology of private rights 
in intellectual property finds itself is further underlined by the fact that those private rights are asserted 
by private economic enterprises (individualism in rights). This new ideology involves the libertarian 
agenda of rights in property (Lockean, Rawlsian, Mergesian) that are backed up by Hohfeldian rights-
claims guaranteed by domestic state power (intellectual property laws) and external state legal 
relations (international intellectual property laws). It is this new territory in the ideology of private 
rights in intellectual property that also echoes the argument that property and sovereignty are an 
intricate mix of private rights relations within contemporary international law. Writing in 1927, 
Morris Cohen, outlined the relationship that private property rights creates in relation to power: 
dominium versus imperium.132 In other words, the private rights in property functions in a master and 
commander way by giving power over things (dominium) and power over other people (imperium). 
From this, it is evident, that private property rights have changed: and it is still doing so; changing 
the face of public international law.133  
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2. Proportionality in international intellectual property law 
 
A few sections above we were introduced to the principle of proportionality as part of the complex 
systems of Mergesian justification for intellectual property rights. For Merges, the proportionality 
principle, is one of the most under theorised of the four mid-level principles and he argues that “an 
IP right ought to be proportional to the contribution of a creative work”, and therefore, “central to IP 
law.”134  
Merges writes:  
Proportionality shows up in all sorts of IP rules, from infringement and remedies in copyright, 
to the requirements of patentability, to various trademark doctrines. It shows itself most 
clearly when a creator claims a right whose value is grossly disproportionate to the actual 
contribution at issue. In this situation, IP law finds a way to prevent the awarding of a 
disproportionate right (my emphasis).135 
He later notes:  
[O]n the proportionality principle in IP law, I offer a general principle that pulls together a 
large number of distribution-oriented rules scattered throughout IP law. […] I describe the 
idea of proportional reward as one of the essential conceptual building blocks of IP law. 
Proportionality carries an inherent distributional element: each creator should obtain rights 
commensurate with and proportional to the value of his contribution (my emphasis).136 
Why does Merges opt to frame proportionality as part of the four mid-level principles, and moreover, 
the most important principle? He sets out his reasons early in chapter 6: 
I have chosen to emphasize proportionality for two reasons. First, it is the most undertheorized 
of the four midlevel principles. […] Proportionality is rarely identified as a stand-alone 
principle […] Second, I believe the proportionality principle illustrates exceedingly well what 
a midlevel principle is. Proportionality sits solidly between lower-level principles, or 
foundational theory, and the detailed practices of IP law – the rules and institutions that apply 
this body of law to real-world problems (my emphasis).137 
These conceptions of the proportionality principle in intellectual property that Merges discuss are in 
the context of American intellectual property law – yet, they are also applicable to rights in intellectual 
property irrespective of jurisdiction. For Merges, proportionality not only justifies intellectual 
property, but it also explains some of the legal restrictions surrounding intellectual property. 
Furthermore, for Merges, proportionality acts as a foundation to support general principles in 
intellectual property.138 Merges’ discussion of the proportionality principle is important given that in 
different legal orders such as the European legal system, and or international law, the proportionality 
principle is important. Thus, in this context, to what extent is the proportionality principle present in 
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international intellectual property law? It is against this background that I sketch out briefly the 
proportionality principle from an international intellectual property law perspective.  
The proportionality principle in international law is well established and can be found in various 
regimes of international law139 – from international humanitarian law140 to international investment 
law.141 As a general principle “proportionality means that a State’s acts must be a rational and 
reasonable exercise of means towards achieving a permissible goal, without unduly encroaching on 
protected rights of either the individual or another State.”142 The principle of proportionality invokes 
a sort of just approach to the exercise and use of international law (or the legal instruments that makes 
up international legal relations) reflecting domestic traits on fairness and justice.143 Furthermore, 
international law recognises the principle of proportionality as a balancing act between “the effects 
of measures chosen against the objective sought.”144 As the principle of proportionality expands and 
engulfs different regimes in international law – its underlying role appears to be a special link that 
binds the constitutive formation of the various regimes in international law. If this is the case, then, 
the arguments by Merges on the liberal expansion of rights in intellectual property; where 
proportionality shows up in all the various intellectual property rules; are transposing intellectual 
property constitutionalism from the domestic level to the international level. That transposition, is, in 
the sense, that there are numerous international treaties, bilateral treaties and regional treaties on 
intellectual property. But, although the proportionality principle is well established in different 
regimes in international law, it is not so clear cut what the situation is in regards to the principle of 
proportionality in international intellectual property law. It is fairly a new phenomenon mostly 
associated with the post-TRIPs system of international intellectual property law.145  
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, there was not a concerted effort per se to search for harmonisation or 
any balanced form of international intellectual property rules. The pre-TRIPS international 
intellectual property treaty system, such as the Paris and Berne Conventions, were designed primarily 
for specific intellectual property regime – example, the Berne Convention for the copyright regime. 
Little, if any harmonisation were achieved under singular aim intellectual property treaties. The 
situation changed dramatically with the TRIPs Agreement, as various agendas and competing 
interests; and the need for a globalised and harmonised system of intellectual property rules; even if 
it meant such harmonisation were de minimis, were advanced. Moreover,  TRIPs provided for a 
broader policy context of intellectual property at the international level as opposed to the policy 
context of intellectual property rules at the domestic level and this gives the TRIPsS a stimulus to 
reach out to the general proportionality  principles present in the broader forum of international law.  
The general principle of proportionality in international law was attractive to international intellectual 
property rules in the post-TRIPs era because the central actors in intellectual property – owners – 
began to see their economic participation in the international economic system were aligning with the 
objectives of states. Intellectual property owners expect that in light of the expanding nature of 
international trade – they are entitled to reasonable returns that are proportional to their investment. 
On the one hand, the interests of states, from the perspective of intellectual property in the 
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international economic system was about the promotion of trade; investments and economic growth. 
And on the other, the interests of intellectual property owners, was the reward they can reap from 
their intellectual property investments in the expanding world of economic opportunities. For 
intellectual property owners, they are more inclined to view their rights as also providing a benefit to 
society, in that, their economic returns on their investments are proportional to the benefits they 
receive in light of international rules. Thus, it was also incumbent on them to ensure that their 
legitimate interests in the international intellectual property system were guaranteed under some form 
of harmonised rules – backed by states. These varied interests for states and intellectual property 
owners were therefore suitable for intellectual property owners where the general principle of 
proportionality was in the middle; acting as the gate keeper of fairness and justice in terms of how 
the states enforce intellectual property rules, and how the remedies for intellectual property violations 
were applied. Seen in this context – one effect of the proportionality principle in international 
intellectual property is that it opens up genuine discussions on the scope of rights in intellectual 
property.  
So, how can proportionality be considered as part of international intellectual property law in light of 
the above discussion? The starting point is the terms and scope of the TRIPS Agreement. The various 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement – are in fact – a norm setting conveyor belt that is designed 
around proportionality as principle. What I mean by this is that there is no single provision in the 
TRIPS Agreement that can be specifically singled out as containing the principle of proportionality. 
Rather, various TRIPS norms “include broad and undefined legal concepts such as reasonableness, 
legitimate interests, or necessity”146 forms part of the TRIPs proportionality paradigm. Part of the 
reason for this is because the TRIPS Agreement, from its very beginning, was an exercise not only to 
harmonise, but also to balance the various interests of states and intellectual property owners. The 
most direct reference to proportionality in the TRIPS Agreement can be found in Article 46 where it 
calls for the “need of proportionality” as part of other remedies in enforcing intellectual property.147 
But given the complexity of the TRIPS Agreement – in that it is a compromise between states and 
intellectual property owners to “balance rights and obligations”148 then, proportionality in the TRIPS 
Agreement must be seen in the context of specific TRIPS provisions. In other words, proportionality 
in Article XYZ may not mean the same in Article ZYX. Therefore, there is conflict of interest in the 
TRIPS Agreement, from both a policy perspective and a legal perspective, in relation to 
proportionality in international intellectual property rules. Thus, attempts to find a balance between 
these two positions are likely to be based on a careful analysis of the objectives and functions of 
specific TRIPS provisions.  
To apply the proportionality principle test in the TRIPS Agreement – different factors have to be 
considered. These factors have a common denominator: legitimate aim (interests); necessity; 
suitability and proportionality stricto sensu. What these common elements must take into 
consideration are the right of the state, as enshrined in an international agreement (this case the TRIPS 
– and broadly the WTO) to intervene in the rights to the covered intellectual property; and then, avoid 
too drastic an intervention that eradicate the covered right in the first place. Furthermore, applying 
proportionality stricto sensu must weigh the gains of an intervention in the covered right. To put it 
another way – what are the net benefits of compulsory licensing for patented medicines when the 
owners are expecting a just reward for their investments? That is the situation a judicial body will 
find itself in when there is a need to analyse the proportionality principle: the need for the balancing 
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of public welfare (access to medicine), and how the negative effects of compulsory licensing for 
granting access affects the intellectual property owner.  
A final argument in relation to the proportionality principle in international intellectual property law 
is its relationship to WTO law (where the TRIPS Agreement is part of the WTO). This is a broader 
discussion that cannot be completely addressed in this section, suffice to say that, if the 
proportionality principle is a general principle recognised in international law – does it mean that the 
proportionality principle is a recognised principle in WTO law? According to the WTO Agreement 
– its covered agreements including the TRIPS are to be interpreted in light of international law.149 
Furthermore, various Panels and Appellate Body reports have confirmed that WTO rules are part of 
general international law. Given that the proportionality principle in the TRIPS Agreement, are to be 
gleaned from various articles, and not a single provision per se, this raises the question, as to whether 
proportionality is a general principle of WTO law, or only, deemed to occur only in specific 
circumstances when the TRIPS Agreement is being interpreted. For some academic scholars who 
have examined the relationship of proportionality and WTO law, they are not convinced that the 
principle of proportionality is applicable to WTO law – but rather can serve as guiding interpretative 
principle.150 For supporters of the principle of proportionality in the WTO – they believe that one of 
the test for proportionality – necessity – should be construed as the correct way to interpret the 
proportionality principle in the WTO.151 This schism in the academic jurisprudence on the existence 
of the proportionality principle in the WTO reflects only the fact that the proportionality principle is 
inherently complex. The few intellectual property disputes in the WTO that have engaged 
proportionality or the provisions in the TRIPS that reflects proportionality, those decisions generally 
veered towards only one of the tests for proportionality. For example in Canada – Patents, the Panel 
defined “legitimate interests” as a normative claim, it also cautioned that it could not embraced the 
definition of legitimate interests in a legal sense.152 Perhaps, it is no coincidence that the only case in 
the WTO that could have settled the question, as to whether the proportionality principle is part of 
WTO law, in the same fashion that the proportionality principle is recognised in public international 
law, was settled before it could have been litigated regarding access to medicine and the HIV 
epidemic in South Africa in the 1990s.153  
 
3. The leverage point consensus of international intellectual property  
 
In this section I examine intellectual property law in the context of traditional public international law 
by incorporating the discussions in the previous sections. Ideally, the goal is to demonstrate, without 
going into the technical interactions of international intellectual property and international law, that 
intellectual property rights are leveraging tools in international law. This leveraging phenomenon is 
then resulted in the privatisation of international law. In the discussion so far, we have looked at the 
justification for property rights against the major libertarian thoughts (Lockean, Hohfeldian, 
Rawlsian) and intellectual property in the modern context (Mergesian). It must also be noted that 
private law (including private international law) and the realm of public law (including public 
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international law) has a distinctive history, whereas, it is generally seen that public international law 
emerged from private international law: the ius civile versus ius gentium dichotomy. That relationship 
is crucial because private state relations (conflict of laws/private international law) gradually became 
a concern of activities beyond state borders in which the laws governing state relations (law of 
nations/public international law) had to respond to.154 Arguendo, property rights give rise to private 
law and private law give rise to the law of nations.  
Most countries in the world today have economies that are built on various forms of market liberalism 
where individualism, freedom of choice and international trade is cornerstone to their economic 
development or their expansion of wealth. Property rights in the form of intellectual property are key 
to this economic development or wealth expansion. Hence, it is under these circumstances that 
intellectual property owners can leverage their rights within the boundaries of the external law 
governing state relations. This leveraging of intellectual property through external law of state 
relations opens up corridors to various disputes among states concerning the “domestic impact of 
particular intellectual property regimes for individual states and their citizens”155 usually through the 
application of international law. In this grand leveraging technique, the protection of intellectual 
property within the internal borders of the state is paramount; and so too, is the state and nature of the 
international legal regime for intellectual property. Thus, the broader scope of international law is 
reduced to remedial measures for private rights owners as opposed to the interests of all states.  
International law in general function as an arbiter of disputes among states. The various regimes of 
international law are given priority based on the nature of the dispute. Disputes on armed conflicts 
generally requires the invocation of international humanitarian law, and disputes concerning patents 
in the international economic system may involve a myriad of treaties.156 The point is – for 
international law to function and respond to the claims and counterclaims in the modern world – it 
has specific treaty regimes to leverage and therefore respond adequately to various disputes. But, 
there is also another leverage point that international law has at its advantage in responding to global 
disputes: the state of domestic law in relation to the dispute. Furthermore, international law must 
consider what is the nature of the governance structure at the domestic level and how that governance 
structure relates to key developments at the international level. Another point is how can international 
law function properly without interfering the sovereignty of the domestic state.157 The sovereignty 
question is more problematic, as any perceived interference in the political operations and legal policy 
making of the domestic state using international law can be construe as sovereignty interference. 
However, states which voluntarily participates in the international economic system leverage various 
rules in the economic domain to serve the proper function of international law – remedial consensus 
– that confirms the objectives of states participation in international law. The participation of states 
in the international economic system serves a primary objective of economic wealth maximisation; 
where rules provides for a level playing field and provides incentives and opportunities for goods and 
services. Such opportunities are grounded in the ownership of private property rights that are granted 
through the power of the state to legislate.  
The leverage point consensus of states in the international economic system that I briefly highlighted 
above can be demonstrated through the international intellectual property protection of patents. 
According to Article 271(1) of the TRIPS Agreement – WTO members are required to make patents 
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“available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology.”158 This is 
the first leverage point consensus – the state of domestic law – in that states are required to have 
domestic laws for patents. Thus, if states had no prior patent laws, and subsequently signed up to the 
TRIPS Agreement – they are expected to fulfil this TRIPS obligation. A further provision of Article 
17(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, notes that, for patents to be available, they are to fulfil certain 
conditions: in that, a patent must be “new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application.”159 To determine these criteria domestically, the state, must, in addition to patent laws, 
set up institutions that can determine new patents, their non-obviousness (inventive step) and use 
(industrial application). This requires a further leverage point consensus – institutions with 
governance structures – that mirrors international institutions such as the WIPO (or regional in some 
cases, example the European Patent Office (EPO)). Most domestic patent offices, or those that were 
non-existent prior to the TRIPS – have streamlined their governance structures to reflect the WIPO 
and the EPO. Moreover, the WIPO have had various programs to train and ensure that the eligibility 
criteria for patents meets the most basic requirements set out the TRIPS Agreement. The third and 
final leverage point consensus is the nature of patents within international law – that is under the 
TRIPS Agreement – as an instrument of international law. Thus, further in Article 27(1) “patents 
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the 
field technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.”160 What this provision tells 
us, is that, patents are also responsible for international trade – in that, the goods covered by patents 
are tradeable in the international economic system and such goods should not be discriminated 
against; and is, therefore, a leverage point consensus under international law. In other words, the 
TRIPS Agreement must able to function in such a way that it does not interfere in the sovereignty of 
a nation if patentable goods in international trade are discriminated against.  
The patent provisions of the TRIPS Agreement have had an effect on the state of domestic laws in 
relation to patents, in that, they have either required states to implement patent laws, where there were 
none before. Furthermore, states with patent laws at the time of the TRIPS Agreement, had to improve 
their legislations to meet the TRIPS criteria. Given that the TRIPS Agreement has been seen as a 
developed state centric treaty, then the domestic patent law of those states are arguable reflected in 
the TRIPS – which non-developed states would be required to meet. In other words, the patent laws 
of XYZ states were imposed upon ZYX states.161 The criteria for patents are basically uniform in 
most of the developed countries, especially countries that are responsible for more than 80 percent of 
the world patent applications and granting.162 These same states (the US, Japan,163 Korea,164 Europe165 
and China166) are responsible for most of the world trading volume – and except for China, were the 
main protagonists of the TRIPS Agreement. The criteria for patents (eligibility) in the domestic laws 
of the developed states may vary slightly, and only in relation to the type of patents. For instance, 
although the UK generally adheres to the patent eligibility criteria of the EPO, it has developed its 
own test based on “novelty”, “inventive step”, “prior art”, and “technical contribution”.167 In the US, 
a patent can be granted for inventions covering, process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
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matter,168 and in Japan, patents are granted for “highly advanced creations”.169 These slight 
differences on the patent eligibility criteria in the developed states merely reflects the type of patent 
sought. As such, the actual grant of a patent through the state’s power to legislate (patent laws) that 
promotes economic growth and innovation (property rights in patents to private owners) is merely 
part of the leveraging process in intellectual property. Without the various leverage consensus points 
in the patent chain – to paraphrase Mark Twain – a country is just a “crab”170 and would be excluded 
from the gains in international trade where intellectual property rights are enforced.  
Given that the TRIPS Agreement is an international treaty and forms part of the WTO treaty system 
– a pertinent question arise in the context of the leverage point consensus argument – whose interest 
it was for the inclusion of intellectual property rights in the WTO system? The states or private 
interests (the owners of intellectual property rights)? There is abundant literature that discussed the 
private interests of intellectual property owners as using their coercive powers through ownership 
that allowed for the inclusion of the TRIPS in the WTO.171 However, what has not been discussed is 
whether states had had a genuine interest in the TRIPS Agreement – without any form of coercion. I 
believe that the moving tides of international trade and the rules, that evolved to form the WTO 
system, allowed states to leverage, not on international rules on trade in goods, but also rules on the 
international intellectual property regime. States did not want to be seen as meandering crab, rather, 
they wanted to be part of the club and exercise their ability to shape the global rules on the economic 
system. The TRIPS Agreement represented a platform for states to transplant the domestic rights 
enshrined on intellectual property beyond the borders of the nation state – so that there could be net 
benefits for the state in terms of economic investments and also, as champions of market liberalism 
that intellectual property rights represents. The global pandemic of trade liberalisation was re-shaping 
the international economic system, and accompanying that pandemic was the scope of property rights, 
that would now represent global goods, and those rights had to be backed by states. Had states not 
backed the system of domestic rights that were now migrating to the international plane – they would 
have been seen as diluting property rights. Thus, for states, property rights in the TRIPS Agreement 
represents a continuum of private property rights. States realised that a comprehensive international 
regulatory structure, was a formal acknowledgement, of the new era of a pluralistic liberalism. 
Essential to the new era was how market transactions leads to more gains, and the behavioural norms 
of states in their relations with other states, especially when dealing with goods and economic 
resources because of intellectual labour. Thus, states, by signing up to the new regulatory framework 
of intellectual property in TRIPS opened new opportunities for transactions in new technological 
developments, goods and medicine,172 that were otherwise inaccessible due to weak or no intellectual 
property framework. Both individuals and states were now capable of leveraging intellectual property 
rights.173 
The emergence of the post-TRIPS international intellectual property rules allowed private economic 
rights in intellectual property “to be seen as a national and international enterprise”174 and at the same 
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time, reigniting old “doctrinal source of the tension between public concerns about monopoly and the 
vesting of private property rights in knowledge.”175 Yet, it is that same tension that allows for how 
states and private economic interests leverage intellectual property rights to their mutual advantage. 
As states and private economic interests compete for the right to international law in intellectual 
property – major tribunals such as the WTO Panels were also confirming that the TRIPS Agreement 
were to be seen within the spirit of international law.176 The TRIPS Agreement, as Canada – Patents 
notes, is part of customary international law, and also international treaty law.177 This was consistent 
with the broader consensus that the WTO covered agreements including the TRIPS Agreement were 
to be interpreted in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.178 
But as intellectual property expands and a rise in international trade relied more and more on 
international law – private economic interests were turning to international intellectual property rules 
as part of public international to law to erect enforcement barriers around their private rights in 
intellectual property. The most contentious issue in recent times has been the property rights in 
trademarks as part of international investments.179 The property rights in trademarks through 
investments were now drawing battle lines among the competing interests in intellectual property at 
the international level. Those interests are primarily to have a more uniform protection of intellectual 
property rights globally; effective reinforcements of such rights; and that such rights do not become 
barriers to legitimate trade.180  
E. Conclusion 
 
This article argued that the philosophical foundations of property rights served as the fundamental 
basis to understand the ideological premise to justify intellectual property and its behavioural pattern 
in the international economic system. As shown above,  intellectual property rights are  justified in a 
Rawlsian sense, but, the deep legal contents of intellectual property rights require Hohfeldian legal 
analysis given that rights in the strict legal sense depended on the jural relations (laws and legal 
systems) in a state. Furthermore, it has been established that the coercive (exclusive) nature of  
intellectual property enabled private owners to engage the power of states to shape the wider 
legislative and treaty system of intellectual property. The result is the privatisation of international 
law through intellectual property enforcement and regulation. . The right to have rights in 
international intellectual property presupposes a fundamental right in international law, whereas, the 
latter was now responding to the private legal rights of economic interests and changing the contours 
of public international law. By engaging in the ideological premise of intellectual property the article 
provided a rich insight on the rights paradigm in real property theories and the contemporary 
justification of intellectual property that involved various regimes with different interests and 
agendas. The underlying theme, or link that holds the various intellectual property regime together is 
the state guarantee of rights to property in a free market society with democratic values The three 
lines of theoretical background developed in this article (Hofeldian, Rawlsian, and Mergesian) 
moreover supported the claim that the justification of intellectual property rights represents continuity 
in the liberal thought – and helps to maintain the ideological premise that intellectual property are 
special private rights that requires special protection in the international legal order.  
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